The present paper develops arguments for the need to formulate the basic theories of physics in terms of a six-dimensional manifold, as opposed to the four-dimensional space-time continuum of conventional theory. Employing a purely classical approach, some of the dynamical consequences of such a formulation with regard to both electrodynamics and gravitation are evaluated. The results lead to interesting implications with regard to various questions such as the occurrence and importance of superluminal particles, the existence of two or more physically (...) distinct time scales, and the variation of the gravitational coupling constant G and the law of energy conservation. The analysis also suggests a physical interpretation of the additional coordinates that occur in the metric. (shrink)

We construct a Hilbert style system RPL for the notion of plausibility measure introduced by Halpern J, and we prove the soundness and completeness with respect to a neighborhood style semantics. Using the language of RPL, we demonstrate that it can define well-studied notions of necessity, conditionals and propositional identity.

In this article I have tried to rebut certain types of arguments which purport to show not merely that God does not exist but that the notion of necessary existence is itself either self-contradictory or senseless. In showing that it is not self-contradictory I have allowed myself the luxury of a negative and a positive approach. Negatively, I have had to show that when the accusation of self-contradiction is made, it is often accompanied, not by an argument but by a (...) sheer assertion. On the rare occasions when an argument is forthcoming, the arguments, I have tried to show, have been invalid, not even, inconclusive. And to the extent that Kant may be said to have argued not simply the impossibility of a genuine proof of the existence of God, but indeed the impossibility of the concept of necessary existence, I have argued out the weakness of Kant's arguments, the most notable of which I have discussed in some detail. Finally, to establish the genuineness of the concept of necessary existence, positively, I have paradoxically made use of a notion from Russell's logic. (shrink)

A paradox is a situation in which two seemingly equally rational lines of thought lead to contradictory conclusions. A moral paradox is a situation where the employment of diverse moral principles, each of which is at least intuitively acceptable to roughly the same degree, leads to radically different moral assessments of one and the same action. In his “Some Paradoxes of Deterrence” Gregory Kavka argues that such moral paradoxes lurk in the concept of deterrence and further that the present world (...) situation of mutual nuclear deterrence may well provide a concrete illustration of these paradoxes. That deterrence can involve paradox may well be true, but what I wish to consider here is whether the case of nuclear deterrence is in fact an instance of “paradoxical deterrence”. (shrink)

Beauchamp and Childress here collaborate to provide a set of action-guides or principles which in their judgment apply to a wide range of biomedical problems. Their work consists of eight chapters and two appendices. In the first two chapters attention centers on the nature of a moral dilemma and moral reasoning and on types of normative ethical theories. Chapters 3 through 6 discuss the principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice, while chapters 7 and 8 deal, respectively, with the professional-patient (...) relationship and with the role that virtues, ideals, personal integrity, and conscience have to play in the moral life. Appendix I provides twenty-nine case studies illustrating dilemmas in biomedical ethics, and reference to those studies is made throughout the text. Appendix II gives the texts of important biomedical codes of ethics. (shrink)

I give a brief precis of Lyons' book. I discuss the problem of delineating basic from non-basic beliefs. I argue that one of Lyons' possible solutions doesn't work - his definition of a perceptual module does not allow us to decide which beliefs are basic. And I argue that another possible solution undermines some of Lyons' motivation. The intuitive understanding of belief may not generate the Clairvoyancy troubles he fears.

Neutral monist, panpsychist, naturalist, and phenomenological interpretations of James's theory of mind are canvassed. Culling the true tenets from each, I make a case for a reconciling view on the basis of a distinction between mental and proto-mental properties. The resulting interpretation is compared to two forms of panpsychism identified by T Nagel in his essay of that name.

Biologists who work on the pig (_Sus scrofa_) take advantage of its similarity to humans by constructing the inferential and material means to traffic data, information and knowledge across the species barrier. Their research has been funded due to its perceived value for agriculture and medicine. Improving selective breeding practices, for instance, has been a driver of genomics research. The pig is also an animal model for biomedical research and practice, and is proposed as a source of organs for cross-species (...) transplantation: xenotransplantation. Genomics research has informed transplantation biology, which has itself motivated developments in genomics. Both have generated models of correspondences between the genomes of pigs and humans. Concerning genomics, I detail how researchers traverse species boundaries to develop representations of the pig genome, alongside ensuring that such representations are sufficiently porcine. In transplantation biology, the representations of the genomes of humans and pigs are used to detect and investigate immunologically-pertinent differences between the two species. These key differences can then be removed, to ‘humanise’ donor pigs so that they can become a safe and effective source of organs. In both of these endeavours, there is a tension between practices that ‘humanise’ the pig (or representations thereof) through using resources from human genomics, and the need to ‘dehumanise’ the pig to maintain distinctions for legal, ethical and scientific reasons. This paper assesses the ways in which this tension has been managed, observing the differences between its realisations across comparative pig genomics and transplantation biology, and considering the consequences of this. (shrink)

New foreword written by HeritageMom, Amber O'Neal Johnston. "During a time when the United States needed to be reminded of the contributions Black people have made to its democracy, freedom, music, literature, and more, W.E.B. Du Bois took on the task of enumerating the gifts that we've provided to our country. "When I began reading The Gift of Black Folk...the story that unfolded was one that I had never anticipated. We the People of the United States, all of us, have (...) left our indelible mark on America the Beautiful." -Amber O'Neal Johnston In 1924, William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) Du Bois (1868-1963) penned The Gift of Black Folk in response to systemic racism in the United States, showing that "...the American spirit is a new and interesting result of diverse threads of thought and feeling coming not only from America but from Europe and Asia and indeed from Africa." Du Bois was the first African American to earn a Ph.D. from Harvard University, and later became a professor of history, sociology, and economics at Atlanta University. In 1909 he co-founded the NAACP. Du Bois was a lifelong leader and proponent of civil rights. Amber O'Neal Johnston is a writer, speaker, and home educator who blends life-giving books with a culturally-rich environment for her four children and others. She's the author of A Place to Belong, a guide for families of all backgrounds to celebrate cultural heritage and embrace inclusivity in the home and beyond, and she's known for sharing literary "mirrors and windows" on HeritageMom.com. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the consequences of new scientific and philosophical approaches for the practical-theoretical framework of modern developmental biology. I highlight normal development, and the instructive-permissive distinction, as key parts of this framework which shape how variation is conceptualised and managed. Furthermore, I establish the different dimensions of biological variation: the units, temporality and mode of variation. Using the analytical frame established by this, I interpret a selection of examples as challenges to the instructive-permissive distinction. These examples include (...) the phenomena of developmental plasticity and transdifferentiation, the role of the microbiome in development, and new methodological approaches to standardisation and the assessment of causes. Furthermore, I argue that investigations into organismal development should investigate the effects of a wider range of kinds of variation including variation in the units, modes and temporalities of development. I close by examining various possible opportunities for producing and using normal development free of the assumptions of the instructive-permissive distinction. These opportunities are afforded by recent developments, which include new ways of producing standards incorporating more natural variation and being based on function rather than structure, and the ability to produce, store, and process large quantities of data. (shrink)

I find this postulate of Mr. Blanshard's puzzling, and I wish to exhibit some perplexing features of it, and therefore of the business of the philosopher as he understands it.

I offer here a solution to a mystery about William James's theory of the self. Among the many students of James who have been mystified is Gerald Myers, who expresses surprise in William James: His Life and Thought that, given the religious and mystical overtones of his later metaphysics, James did not abandon the apparent bodily self of the earlier Principles of Psychology for a “nonbodily, spiritual, and mysterious referent for the first-person pronoun,” instead of consistently adhering “to his claims (...) that the body is at the center of any experience of self, that nothing nonbodily shows itself definitely to introspection, and that nothing about using I makes a mystery of the self”. The mystery is particularly deep because James explicitly avowed the coherence of the Principles treatment of the self with the later metaphysical treatment, such as the material in Essays in Radical Empiricism. Arguing in “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?” from the Essays that a metaphysics of pure experience should replace the dichotomy between consciousness and the body, James adduces in support his earlier discussion of the self: “In my Psychology I have tried to show that we need no knower other than the ‘passing thought’.” On the other hand, Myers observes, “if telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition actually occur,” as James was disposed to think, “our everyday equation of the self with bodily experience will surely require some revision”. Then too James's religious convictions as expressed in The Varieties of Religious Experience would also seem to call for revision of the earlier equation. James wrote there, for instance, that “the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its chief significance” and that “union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end.” “Yet instead of suggesting how his psychological concept of the self might have shifted during the progression from Principles to the metaphysics of pure experience,” Myers comments with a note of puzzlement, “James wrote in his later period that this concept was a natural ally if not the original herald of that metaphysics.”. (shrink)

The two interpretations with which La Croix is dissatisfied are 1) the traditional view, which focuses exclusively on St. Anselm’s argument for the existence of God in Proslogion II; and 2) the newer view, championed by Hartshorne and Malcolm, which claims that the argument in Proslogion III supercedes the material in Proslogion II, and is immune from the traditional criticisms. Neither view is correct, La Croix argues, because both assume that Proslogion II and III are logically separable. La Croix places (...) extreme emphasis on Anselm’s assertion in the Preface to the Proslogion that he found "one argument" by means of which he could prove both that God exists and that God possesses the traditional divine attributes. According to La Croix, the overall structure of the Proslogion is to show first, in chapters II and III, that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived exists, and then, in the subsequent chapters, that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is God, i.e., has the various perfections traditionally ascribed to God. The major task of the book is to argue that neither chapter II nor chapter III contains a "logically complete and independent" argument for the existence of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived, but that taken together, they provide the premises for the propositions that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived exists, cannot be thought not to exist, and cannot not exist. Moreover, La Croix argues that there are no new arguments presented in Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo: all the apparently new arguments merely make explicit what was left implicit in the Proslogion. As one can guess from these few remarks, there is much to quarrel with in La Croix’s book, but that is a never-ending feature of historical interpretation, and one can certainly sympathize with La Croix’s complaints against the other two interpretations. Unfortunately, La Croix relies on the Charlesworth translation of the Proslogion and the Reply, a translation which is not to be used without great care.—W. E. M. (shrink)

A unique description of the phenomena that arise from the interaction between quantum systems and their environment. Because of the novel character of the approach discussed, the book addresses scientists from all fields of physics and related disciplines as well as students of physics.

Brian Ellis has argued that the assigning of forces is, in the final analysis, a matter of convention. This conclusion is backed by the premises (1) that forces and force-effects are necessary and sufficient for each other, and (2) that the classification of some state of affairs as a force-effect is at least partly conventional. We argue that the first premise is false, that the second premise is ambiguous as between several senses of "conventional," and finally that he has not (...) established that force-effects are conventional in the sense required for the conclusion he wishes to draw. (shrink)

This article focuses on the occasional individuals of many species that live longer than is usual for their populations – here called longevity outliers. They appear to be exceptions to the usual patterns of mortality rates that increase with age. There is no model of survivorship that accommodates all of these individuals. They are less vulnerable to the usual causes of death than most in their populations. There are hints of genetically based mechanisms in the form of life‐prolonging genes in (...) invertebrates and genetic resistance to fatal diseases in higher organisms. The reasons why longevity outliers ultimately die are not known. Based on well‐established trends, I predict that there will be many more humans reaching very old ages in the next century. (shrink)

Physique de Nietzsche uses Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle to suggest a reading of Nietzsche escaping the "circle of metaphysics". It thereby questions Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. Just as for Heidegger’s Aristotle φύσις is ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν, so for Juranville’s Nietzsche will is will to power. The will to power must be understood not in terms of will but in terms of power. Nietzsche interprets the world physically and nontechnically as will to power, i.e., as life, energy, (...) force, power, fatum, "Physis". Will to power, the innermost essence of things, is a kind of internal principle of motion analogous to Aristotelian φύσις. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Remembering Lewis E. HahnGeorge C. H. Sun, President, John Howie, Professor Emeritus, Thomas Alexander, Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, Kenneth W. Stikkers, Professor and Chair, Randall Auxier, Professor, Robert Hahn, Professor, Joseph Wu, Professor Emeritus, Elizabeth R. Eames, Professor Emeritus, Martin Lu, Professor of Philosophy, George Kimball Plochmann, Professor Emeritus, Matt Sronkoski, Philosophy Graduate and Academic Adviser, Dave Clarke, Professor Emeritus, Eugenie Gatens-Robinson, Professor Emerita, Hans H. Rudnick, (...) Professor Emeritus, Stephen Bickham, Professor EmeritusPresident, and Don Mikula (bio)The following testimonials were offered on the occasion of a memorial gathering for Dr. Lewis E. Hahn held on February 19, 2005, and were compiled for presentation here by Sharon (Hahn) Crowell.A Tribute to Dr. Lewis E. Hahn (1908-2004) from a Global PerspectiveGeorge C. H. Sun President, Thomé H. Fang Institute, Inc., Mobile, AlabamaAmong the philosophical community in both the East and the West, no word of introduction is needed for our beloved Master, who was the recipient of numerous distinctions and honors, with titles that included "Man of the Year in Philosophy" and "Award of Lifetime Achievement." The very name "Lewis E. Hahn" itself already stands now for genuineness, dedication, and fulfillment.A great work is a dialogue with eternity; a great person is such a work. In less than thirty years he succeeded in developing Carbondale from what had been a small college town in the Midwest into the Mecca of American philosophy. His most important achievements were the Dewey Center and the Pepper Archives that he helped install at SIUC These, among other such institutions, will remain a unique contribution, a glory of American philosophy, and a monument in the history of human thought.For posterity Lewis E. Hahn will remain an object of wonder and amazement. How is it possible for one human being to have accomplished so much, so well, and in so short a span of time—less than one century—in breadth, depth, and diversity? Some one hundred years ago, by bridging the gap between the New World and the Old, William James was hailed as the great genius of international friendship among philosophical thinkers, but we now find a greater genius in Lewis E. Hahn, who succeeded in bringing together the peoples of East and West from at least four continents: Europe, Australia, America (both North and Latin America), and Asia. To my knowledge, few of his predecessors and contemporaries have been half so widely read and liberal-minded as he was, in view of the range and scope of the Library of Living Philosophers that he helped continue after the passing of its founder, Dr. Paul A. Schilpp.What type of man was Hahn, our younger generation will wonder? Only a pluralist approach can help us understand the true character of such a legendary pluralist-contextualist. In short, he was "a full personality." As I recall, while working on my dissertation with him in the 1970s, we had a brief discussion on Confucius, the sage of ancient China. "A full personality!" was his laconic assessment. Suddenly I realized, to quote the Analects: "The Master is talking about himself!" For, as the Buddhists put it, only a Buddha can understand a Buddha. Or, as William James put it, only one who has philosophy can appreciate philosophy. Many friends [End Page 1] of my generation admire him so much; Te Chen of Hong Kong calls him "a great Confucian in America." Those who regret the loss of many precious Confucian virtues in China today have now rediscovered them in the person of Lewis E. Hahn! If Nietzsche called Kant "a great Chinese in Königsberg," it is simply because he had not encountered our own Master.A paradigm of academic leadership, Dr. Hahn is simply irreplaceable—this is a tribute I personally heard in Carbondale in the late 1960s. It is not an exaggeration to say that he was a superb administrator, and he could have been the best Secretary of the State we ever had, for he possessed more in the way of philosophical wisdom than all his predecessors put together! As a great teacher, he was no less "serene, good, learned, wise, and ardent" than... (shrink)

Disciplinary boundaries become increasingly unclear when grappling with “wicked problems,” which present a complex set of policy, cultural, technological, and scientific dimensions. “T-shaped” professionals, i.e. individuals with a depth and breadth of expertise, are being called upon to play a critical role in complex problem-solving. This paper unpacks the notion of the “T-shaped expert” and seeks to situate it within the broader academic literature on expertise, integration, and developmental learning. A component of this project includes an exploratory study, which is (...) aimed at evaluating the emergent attributes of T-shaped expertise in two different educational programs completed between January and May in 2015. The two programs build disciplinary knowledge in science, technology engineering, and mathematics fields at the core, while expanding the students’ awareness and comprehension of other expertise. The courses introduced science and engineering students to case study topics focusing around complex human-technological-ecological systems in a nanotechnology and society course; and the governance of genetically modified organisms in a science, technology, and society course. We analyze pre- and post-test data from this pilot project before presenting findings that pertain to student learning, as well as variants in the methodology and reflect on the utility of the selected methodology for evaluating expertise as it evolves over time. The paper closes with a discussion of a theory of acquisition with implications for delineating early attributes and characteristics of T-shaped expertise. (shrink)

Deciphering how DCAFs (DDB1‐CUL4 Associated Factors) modulate a broad spectrum of cellular processes, including cell cycle progression and maintenance of genomic integrity is critical to better understand cellular homeostasis and diseases. Cells contain more than 100 DCAFs that associate with the Cullin‐Ring Ubiquitin Ligase 4 (CRL4) complex that target specific protein substrates for degradation. DCAFs are thought to act as substrate receptors that dictate the specificity of the ubiquitination machinery (“catalytic DCAFs”). However, recent studies have suggested that some DCAFs might (...) play a different role by targeting CRL4 complexes to distinct cellular compartments (“structural DCAFs”). Once localized to their correct cellular domains, these CRLs dissociate from the structural DCAFs prior to their association with other, substrate‐specific catalytic DCAFs. Thus, we propose that DCAF switches can provide a mechanistic basis for the degradation of proteins that regulate cell growth and proliferation at precise points in space and time. (shrink)